Article 9: Secured Transactions by Altman, Michael L et al.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 9
10-1-1964
Article 9: Secured Transactions
Michael L. Altman
George M. Doherty
Crystal J. Lloyd
Barry E. Rosenthal
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Secured Transactions Commons
This Uniform Commercial Code Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael L. Altman, George M. Doherty, Crystal J. Lloyd & Barry E. Rosenthal, Article 9: Secured Transactions, 6 B.C.L. Rev. 100
(1964), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol6/iss1/9
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
commodation maker. This may be done by oral proof except as against
a holder in due course who does not have notice of the accommodation.
C.J.L.
SECTION 3-606. impairment of Recourse or of Collateral
ROSE V. HOMSEY
— Mass. —, 197 N.E.2d 603 (1964)
Annotated under Section 3-415, supra.
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS
SECTION 9-105. Definition and Index of Definitions
VAN NORDEN V. AUTO CREDIT CO.
109 Ga. App. 208, 135 S.E.2d 477 (1964)
Annotated under Section 3-407, supra.
SECTION 9-110. Sufficiency of Description
YANCEY BROS. CO . V. DEHCO, INC.
108 Ga. App. 875, 134 S.E.2d 828 (1964)
The defendent sold a caterpiller scraper to the plaintiff but identified it
in the bill of sale by an incorrect serial number. The plaintiff resold the
scraper to Gross, the bill of sale again identifying it by the incorrect serial
number. The Cobb Exchange Bank financed Gross' purchase, with the plain-
tiff acting as Gross' guarantor. When Gross defaulted, the bill of sale was
assigned back to the plaintiff who recorded it. Gross, who had retained posses-
sion of the scraper, sold it; and the defendant eventually re-acquired it for
value under a bill of sale identifying the scraper by its correct serial number.
The plaintiff sued in trover and received a judgment awarding him the
scraper. On appeal, the court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial
on the ground that there was no proof that the defendant had either con-
structive or actual notice of the plaintiff's interest. In its discussion the court
noted that despite the incorrect serial number, the recorded bill of sale might
still have served as constructive notice, had the description of the scraper
appearing on the record provided a key to the identity of the property. But
under Georgia decisions, the court concluded, no such key existed in the pres-
ent case. The court further noted that an insufficient description would not
have vitiated the plaintiff's interest as against the defendant if the defendant
had had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's interest or sufficient information
to put him on notice. However, in the present case there was no fact indi-
cating that the defendant knew at the time of re-acquisition that the scraper
was the same one that had been earlier sold under the misdescription.
COMMENT
Under the controlling pre-Code Georgia law, the mere statement of an
incorrect serial number did not prevent the recorded instrument from giving
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constructive notice if the key to the identity of the property was there. In
footnote treatment, the court noted that Sections 9-110, 9-203(1), and
9-402 do not appear to produce any change in this rule.
The court also speculated that, under the Code, actual knowledge or
knowledge of facts which could reasonably put a buyer on inquiry may be
taken into consideration in determining whether the buyer is to be legally
charged with notice of an unperfected security interest. In fact, the Code
does take into consideration actual knowledge under Section 9-301(1) (c).
That section provides that a buyer shall prevail over the holder of an un-
perfected security interest "to the extent that he gives value and receives de-
livery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before
it is perfected." However, since Section 9-301(1)(c) uses the term "knowl-
edge" and not "notice," as those terms are defined in Section 1-201(25),
a buyer who does not have actual knowledge but is only in possession
of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry does not take subject to the un-
perfected interest.
Of course, if the collateral is purchased by a "buyer in ordinary course
of business," as that term is defined in Section 1-201(9), he is entitled to
prevail under Section 9-307(1) even if the plaintiff has filed a financing
statement without misdescription and even if the buyer has knowledge of the
plaintiff's security interest.
In a second footnote the court stated that since a debtor in possession
of his own collateral can obtain the correct identification of the collateral
from the secured party under Section 9-208, a prudent purchaser could re-
quire the debtor to produce such a statement before buying the collateral.
But this is a precaution of limited efficacy. When there is a misdescription in
the records, a purchaser would be at the mercy of the debtor who could
fraudulently refuse to admit that an outstanding security interest existed.
Also, there is the possibility that the secured party would merely incorporate
the same misdescription appearing on record into its statement listing the
collateral, unaware that it was in fact a misdescription.
J.F.R.
SECTION 9-203. Enforceability of Security Interest; Proceeds,
Formal Requisites
YANCEY BROS. CO . V. DEHCO,
108 Ga. App. 875, 134 S.E.2d 828 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-110, supra.
SECTION 9-208. Request for Statement of Account or List
of Collateral
YANCEY BROS. CO . V. DEHCO, INC.
108 Ga. App. 875, 134 S.E.2d 828 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-110, supra.
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SECTION 9-302. When Filing Is Required to Perfect Security
Interest; Security Interest to Which Filing
Provisions of This Article Do Not Apply
CHEYENNE NAT'L BANK V. CITIZENS SAV. BANK
— Wyo. —, 391 P.2d 933 (1964)
O'Dell owned two trucks. Bryan, an accommodation maker, gave O'Dell
a note and a purported chattel mortgage covering the two trucks. O'Dell as-
signed the mortgage and note to the defendant-bank which filed the mort-
gage but failed to have the encumbrance endorsed on the certificates of title
as required by local law. Later, O'Dell obtained a loan from the plaintiff-bank
which was secured by a chattel mortgage in his own name on the same two
trucks. The plaintiff filed the mortgage and caused the encumbrance to be
endorsed on the certificates of title. From a declaratory judgment awarding
priority to the plaintiff's mortgage, the defendant appealed, arguing that the
statute did not expressly provide that the encumbrance must be noted on
certificates of title in order for constructive notice to be effective. The court
affirmed the judgment, holding that full compliance with the recording
statutes causes constructive notice to be effective and that the defendant had
not fully complied. Also, the defendant's mortgage was invalid as against the
plaintiff since Bryan, the "mortgagor," had no interest in or title to the
trucks. In an opinion concurring in the result, one justice pointed out that
Section 9-302(4) of the Code, as enacted in Wyoming subsequent to the
transaction, provided for the first time. that an encumbrance on a motor
vehicle is not perfected as against subsequent bona fide lienholders unless
notation appears on the certificate of title. This, the justice argued, showed
that the legislature itself had construed the former law as not requiring a
notation on the certificate of title as a prerequisite to perfecting an encum-
brance on a motor vehicle.
COMMENT
Wyoming has rejected both alternatives to Sedion 9-302(3) (b)
offered by the official Code and has also rewritten Section 9-302(4). In-
stead of referring the reader to particular local filing statutes which would
substitute for those of the Code, as the official version contemplates, Wyoming
has incorporated these local filing procedures into Section 9-302(4). This
deviation lends support to the concurring opinion, but it is just as plausible
that the legislature, in enacting Section 9-302(4), believed this section to
be merely a restatement of the filing requirements under prior law.
J.F.R.
SECTION 9-306. "Proceeds"; Secured Party's Rights on
Disposition of Collateral
0. M. SCOTT CREDIT CORP. V. APEX INC.
— R.I. —, 198 A.2d 673 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-307, infra.
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SECTION 9-307. Protection of Buyers of Goods
0. M. SCOTT CREDIT CORP. V. APEX INC.
— R.I. —, 198 A.2d 673 (1964)
The plaintiff sold garden supplies to Mass. Hardware pursuant to a trust
receipt which provided that Mass. Hardware was to sell the supplies only to
ultimate consumers. A financing statement was properly filed in Massachu-
setts. When the defendant, a discount house, purchased the plaintiff's products
from Mass. Hardware, the plaintiff brought the present action in replevin,
contending that the sale was unauthorized and that its security interest con-
tinued in the collateral under Section 9-306(2). The defendant argued that it
was a "buyer in ordinary course of business" as defined by Section 1-201(9)
and thus took clear of the plaintiff's security interest under Section 9-307(1),
or that it was alternatively a good faith purchaser under the Factor's Act
[Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 104, § 1 (1958)], and thus entitled to prevail.
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court found that the defendant's
manager had actual knowledge that the sale to his company was in violation
of the security agreement. It therefore held that the defendant was neither
a "buyer in ordinary course of business" under the Code nor a good faith
purchaser under the Factor's Act, and that it thus took the goods subject
to the security agreement.
COMMENT
1. Section 9-201 provides that security agreements are, on the whole,
effective as against third parties. However, Section 9-307(1) qualifies Sec-
tion 9-201 by providing that "buyers in ordinary course of business" take
free of security interests. Such "buyers" are totally unaffected by the security
agreement even if a financing statement is filed, as it was in this case, and
even if the buyer knows of the existence of a security interest in the goods he
is buying. The only thing a buyer cannot know and still be a "buyer in
ordinary course of business" is that the sale to him violates some term in the
security agreement.
2. As the Official Comments to Sections 2-326 and 2-403 make clear, the
drafters of the Code did not intend that local factor's act's be repealed. In
the present case there was no conflict between the statutes. However, if there
had been a conflict, the Rhode Island court could have held that the Code
takes precedence even though Massachusetts has not enacted the General
Repealer provision, Section 10-103. See Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queen-
an, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
J.F.R.
MAIN INVESTMENT CO. V. GISOLFI
203 Pa. Super. 244, 199 A.2d 535 (1964)
The defendant, a consumer, purchased a used car from Casterline, a non-
franchised automobile dealer. The defendant received delivery of the car
together with an executed bill of sale on October 28, but did not receive a
certificate of title. On November 8, Casterline financed his inventory through
the plaintiff-finance company by executing and delivering a trust receipt
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security agreement which covered nine autos including the one previously
delivered to the defendant. A certificate of title for the car in question was
delivered to the plaintiff, containing the car dealer's name as owner and a
notation of the plaintiff's security interest. Subsequently, the finance company
brought the present action to replevy the car, relying on Sterling Acceptance
Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961), for the proposition
that, since the automobile in question was not new, the defendant was on
notice that a certificate of title had been issued for it and should have de-
manded the certificate before accepting delivery. The defendant counter-
claimed, demanding the certificate of title. On appeal from a judgment for
the defendant, the court affirmed, holding that the defendant was a "buyer
in ordinary course of business" as defined by Section 1-201(9) and that he
therefore took free of any security interest under Section 9-307(1). The
court added that even if the proposition advanced by the plaintiff was correct,
that is, that the buyer of a used car is on notice of any encumbrance noted
on the certificate of title, such proposition was not applicable in the present
case where title and possession had passed to the defendant prior to the
execution of the trust receipt security agreement.
COMMENT
In the Grimes case, the court held that a "buyer in ordinary course of
business" of a new car took free of a lien which had been previously noted
on a dealer's certificate of title. The reason was that, under local law, dealers
were not required to obtain certificates of title until the new car had been
sold. In the course of its discussion, however, the Grimes court stated by way
of dicta that the buyer of a used car knows that a certificate of title has al-
ready been issued and expects to have it produced at the time of sale. In the
present case the finance company apparently tried to use this dicta to prove
that the failure of the used car buyer to demand the certificate at the time
of sale precluded him from being a "buyer in ordinary course of business."
However, it would appear that even if the dealer had mortgaged the car and
noted the finance company's encumbrance on the certificate of title prior to
his sale of the car to the defendant, the defendant would still have been a
"buyer in ordinary course of business," for it is only when a buyer takes with
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the security interest of a
third party that he cannot be a "buyer in ordinary course of business." Since
"knowledge" means actual knowledge, it would not have been enough for the
finance company to prove that the notation of the encumbrance on the
certificate put the defendant on notice. Notice is not the same thing as
knowledge. See definitions of knowledge and notice, Section 1-201(25). Also
cf. Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Pa.
1962).
As the court itself suggested, the same result could have been reached
under Section 9-204(1) which provides that a security interest cannot at-
tach unless the debtor has rights in the collateral. In the present case, at the
time of financing his inventory the dealer had no rights in the collateral;
title to the car had passed to the defendant when the dealer had delivered
the car without retaining a security interest. Section 2-401(2).
J.F.R.
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SECTION 9-310. Priority of Certain Liens Arising by
Operation of Law
FIRST NAT'L BANK V. BAHAN
— Ohio C.P.	 198 N.E.2d 272 (1964)
Prior to the effective date of the Code two banks filed chattel mortgages
on the defendant's tractor. Yoder, with no notice or knowledge of the banks'
liens, made repairs on the tractor after the Code became effective. In the
present action, Yoder contended that under Section 9-310 his artisan's lien
had priority over the banks' liens. The court noted that under the old, pre-
Code law the banks' liens were superior and held that under Section 10-102
(2) they were not made subordinate by the state's adoption of the Code. The
court went on to say that if Section 9-310 were applied and Yoder given
priority, the value of the banks' mortgages would be diminished and that
this would contravene constitutional provisions prohibiting a state from pass-
ing any law impairing the obligations of contract.
J.F.R.
SECTION 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures
UNITED STATES V. BAPTIST GOLDEN AGE HOME
226 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Ark. 1964)
To be casenoted in Volume 6, Issue 2.
SECTION 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal
of Collateral
IN RE MOHAMMED
327 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1964)
Mohammed executed a chattel mortgage on his car which was properly
recorded in the county of his residence. Later, he moved to another county
taking his car with him. The mortgagee, with knowledge of the move, failed
to record in this other county. In a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the
car was awarded to the trustee in bankruptcy and the lower court affirmed.
On appeal, the court reversed, holding that under the governing law, after
original compliance with the filing statutes the mortgagee was permitted but
not required to file in the county to which the goods were removed. The
court noted that the subject is of diminished importance since under the
Code, subsequently adopted, the mortgage would remain valid under Section
9-401(3). The mortgagee would not have to refile.
COMMENT
Michigan has adopted the preferred Subsection (3) of Section 9-401
which does not require refiling when collateral is moved to new counties
within the state. Under the alternative Subsection (3), refiling is required
within four months in the county to which the collateral has been removed.
This is the same time period in which a financing statement must be filed
when personal property subject to a perfected security interest in one state
is brought into a Code state. Section 9-103(3).
J.F.R.
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SECTION 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement;
Amendments
YANCEY BROS. CO . V. DEHCO, INC.
108 Ga. App. 875, 134 S.E.2d 828 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-110, supra.
ARTICLE 10: EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEALER
SECTION 10-102. Specific Repealer; Provision for Transition
FIRST NAT'L BANK V. BAHAN
— Ohio C.P. —, 198 N.E.2d 272 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-310, supra.
SECTION 10-103. General Repealer
GARDINER V. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS
413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-725, supra.
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